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RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Stephen R. Galoob*
(forthcoming in NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW)
Retributivist theories of punishment are in tension with due process. Some retributivists adopt a
simple view that punishment of the deserving is normatively justified. However, this Simple
Retributivism licenses unjust and illegitimate rules of criminal procedure. A more refined
version of retributivism, on which a person’s punishment is justified only if she deserves to be
punished for the offense with which she is charged and her desert bases cause her to be liable to
punishment, avoids the troubling implications of Simple Retributivism. Refined Retributivism
also entails specific principles for implementing criminal law—that is, a distinctively
Retributivist Criminal Procedure. On this Retributivist Criminal Procedure, procedural
mechanisms must establish that there are good reasons to believe that an offender deserves to be
punished for an offense, and these reasons must cause the offender’s liability to punishment.
Yet Refined Retributivism is also difficult to reconcile with due process. Although
Retributivist Criminal Procedure has some salutary implications, it also calls for abolishing core
aspects of the U.S. system of criminal justice and features that are essential to any legitimate
criminal justice system. Thus, retributivism (whether Simple or Refined) does not provide the
basis for a just criminal procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
Retributivism is the view that criminal punishment is justified in large part (and perhaps entirely)
by an offender’s deserving to be punished. Retributivism is almost certainly the most prominent
and influential contemporary theory of punishment. Yet this view is controversial, particularly
regarding questions about desert. Retributivists disagree among themselves about the appropriate
bases of desert1 and what a criminal offender deserves.2 Retributivists also disagree with
punishment theorists of other stripes about whether criminal offenders can (or routinely do)
deserve punishment or harsh treatment.3
Can retribution provide what H.L.A. Hart called the “general justifying aim” of a system
of punishment,4 as many retributivists contend?5 Even if the abovementioned controversies about
desert could all be resolved, other powerful challenges would remain. How should desert figure
into the implementation of retributivism in the criminal justice system? The implementation of
retributivism should, at a minimum, be compatible with due process values. If a criminal justice
system animated by retributivist principles would be unjust or illegitimate, then retribution
cannot be the general aim of the criminal justice system.

1

See R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345 (1993); Jeffrie G. Murphy,
The State’s Interest in Retribution, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283 (1994).
2

See Mitchell Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433
(R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011); Douglas Husak, What Do Criminals Deserve?, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND
METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 49 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J.
Morse eds., 2016).
3

Compare Michael Louis Corrado, Why Do We Resist Hard Incompatibilism? Thoughts on Freedom and
Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT (Thomas Nadelhoffer ed., 2011); Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be
Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309 (2014); Derk Pereboom, Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment, in THE
FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 49 (Thomas Nadelhoffer ed., 2013); John Kleinig, What Does Wrongdoing Deserve?, in
RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST. HAS IT A FUTURE 46–62 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011); Stephen Morse, Compatibilist
Criminal Law, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 107 (Thomas Nadelhoffer ed., 2013).
4

H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 9–10 (rev. ed., 2008).

5

See, e.g., John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91 (1999).
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Most punishment theorists (including many who write about retributivism) do not
extensively analyze questions related to due process or criminal procedure.6 A retributivist might
explain this neglect by contending that procedural questions are peripheral to the main
theoretical ambition of establishing retribution as the general justifying aim of the penal system.7
The punishment theorists who have addressed this issue have largely denied that retributivism’s
procedural implications present any distinctive or perplexing questions.8
The neglect of criminal procedure as a theoretical topic is mistaken, and any
complacency of retributivists is unwarranted. When the significance of desert is properly
understood, retributivism calls for specific principles of implementation. In other words, the best
versions of retributivism seem to be committed to a distinctive position, Retributivist Criminal
Procedure, according to which an infliction of punishment is just only if criminal justice
institutions establish that there are good reasons for the adjudicator to believe that an offender
deserves to be punished for a specific offense and these considerations actually cause the
offender to be deemed liable to punishment.

6

Several prominent works of punishment theory provide counterexamples to this contention, including JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990); Vincent
Chiao, Discretion and Domination in Criminal Procedure: Reflections on Pettit, 15 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 92 (2016);
Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of Just Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2002);
Donald Dripps, The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 409, 410 (R. Anthony Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011); ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL:
TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 90 (2007); Paul Roberts, Groundwork for a
Jurisprudence of Criminal Procedure, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 379, 380 (Antony Duff
& Stuart Green eds., 2011); Alec Walen, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account, 76
LA. L. REV. 355 (2015).
7

For example, Joel Feinberg (following Hart) distinguishes between the “justifying aim of [the] whole system”
of criminal law rules and practices and the “rules governing the system’s operation,” which (for liberal theories)
must “at every level … be fair” but are not otherwise informed by the system’s general aim. JOEL FEINBERG,
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 148 (1988).
8

Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (2007);
Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 856 (2007).
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This article has three parts. Part I distinguishes two versions of retributivist theories,
Simple Retributivism and Refined Retributivism. Simple retributivist theories are objectionable
because they misunderstand the significance of desert and license a host of patently illegitimate
criminal procedure mechanisms. Retributivists should therefore favor more refined versions of
retributivism. Refined Retributivism properly appraises the significance of desert and (based on
its implicit theory of criminal procedure) rules out the kinds of illegitimate procedural
mechanisms that Simple Retributivism allows.
Part II more fully articulates Retributivist Criminal Procedure and shows how it follows
logically from Refined Retributivism. Retributivist Criminal Procedure imposes a causation
requirement: in order for someone’s punishment to be permissible, the considerations in virtue of
which she deserves to be punished must causally influence the infliction of punishment on her.
Retributivist Criminal Procedure also imposes a minimal standard of epistemic justification:
punishing someone for an offense is permissible only if there is (at least) good reason to believe
that she deserves to be punished for that offense. At the systemic level, Retributivist Criminal
Procedure holds that criminal procedure institutions may not accept deviations from the
causation requirement or the epistemic justification standard in order to realize other procedural
values.
Part III analyzes several implications of Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Retributivist
Criminal Procedure provides a novel, unified critique of criminal justice practices (such as
pretextual stops, pretextual prosecutions, and plea bargaining) that are both common in the
United States and widely condemned on other grounds. Yet Retributivist Criminal Procedure is
also in tension with several procedural rules and norms that are central to the U.S. system of
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criminal justice and several others that are integral to any just criminal procedure. Thus, Refined
Retributivism, like Simple Retributivism, is difficult to reconcile with due process values.9
I. RETRIBUTIVISM, SIMPLE AND REFINED
Retributivism has many varieties. Every version of retributivism posits an important connection
between punishment and desert, although some specify this connection imprecisely. Consider the
following formulation.
Simple Retributivism: An infliction of punishment is justified when a person is
punished to the extent that is warranted by his desert bases.
Desert bases can be construed broadly to include all of the characteristics, patterns of
deliberation, and/or conduct in virtue of which an offender might deserve punishment.10
Retributivists disagree about many of the terms in Simple Retributivism—for example, over
what counts as punishment and what constitutes a desert basis. Aside from these internecine
disputes, a broader criticism of Simple Retributivism is that it leaves out aspects of the
effectuation of punishment that are important generally, aspects that should be especially
important to retributivists.
Simple Retributivism should be avoided for several reasons. The following case
illustrates one such reason.
Proxy: Social scientific evidence establishes that a system in which judgments
about criminal charges and criminal liability are made solely by utilizing proxies
for deservingness (e.g., past criminal history, race and socio-economic status,
residence in a high-crime neighborhood, neck tattoos) results in more accurate
determinations than a system that requires legally proving the defendant’s desert
bases as a precondition to meting out punishment. Based on these findings, the
9

Throughout this article, I use the term “due process” in a generic sense to indicate the procedural values
necessary for a just and legitimate system of criminal punishment. My claim about retributivism and due process
does not depend on any specific legal or theoretical interpretation of what process is due in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes. Thanks to Alec Walen for encouraging me to clarify this point.
10

JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 58 (1970).

RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 6
criminal justice system is reformed so that all charging and liability judgments are
based on these proxies.
Under this reformed system, Donny is charged with robbing Victoria and
found liable for this crime because he possess a sufficient number of the proxy
factors (including that he has a criminal history, is classified as AfricanAmerican, comes from a bad neighborhood, and has a neck tattoo). As it happens,
Donny actually committed the robbery of Victoria for which he is charged and
found liable. Therefore, the proxy mechanism produced an accurate punishment
in Donny’s case.
The mechanism described in Proxy conflicts with basic aspects of due process and guarantees of
equal protection under law, for many of the reasons pointed out by critics of so-called “risk
prediction” in the criminal justice system.11 Yet although this proxy mechanism is problematic,
the infliction of punishment in this case does not run afoul of Simple Retributivism. Donny
deserves to be punished for robbing Victoria, and he is punished.
What, exactly, is troubling about Proxy? According to one version of retributivism,
punishment is more than something that happens in the wake of wrongdoing. Rather, punishment
publicly responds to an offender’s wrongdoing that condemns the wrongdoer, vindicates the
system of law that the wrongdoer violated, and communicates support to the victims (if any) of
the wrongdoing.12 On these “response” versions of retributivism, Proxy is unsatisfactory because
the proxy system uses substitutes for desert bases to mete out punishment. Since the infliction of
punishment in Proxy is determined solely by these substitutes, it does not respond to Donny’s
wrongdoing as such.

11

See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL
AGE (2008); Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC. REV. 771 (1988);
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
803 (2014).
12

See R. A. Duff, Political Retributivism and Legal Moralism, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2012); Jean Hampton,
Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992); Dan Markel,
What Might Retributive Justice Be?, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 49–72 (Mark D. White
ed., 2011).
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Another version of retributivism posits a specific relationship between an offender’s
desert bases and her punishment, and so would have different objections to Proxy. For example,
David Brink defines retributivism as the view that “reactive attitudes and practices of blame and
punishment should track desert….”13 The contention that punishment should track an offender’s
desert bases can be distinguished from the weaker contention that punishment should merely
correspond to an offender’s desert bases. Tracking implies that the process of meting out
punishment must itself be sensitive to an offender’s desert bases, that changes in an offender’s
desert bases must reliably prompt changes in her punishment.14 Correspondence does not require
this sensitivity. A stopped clock is insensitive to the passage of time, yet its face sometimes
corresponds to the correct time. Likewise, in Proxy a procedure that is insensitive to the
offender’s desert bases nonetheless generates an outcome that corresponds to them. Here, the
insensitive procedure winds up producing an answer that is both correct and identical to the one
that a sensitive decision procedure would have produced. On the “tracking” version of
retributivism, then, the problem in Proxy is that punishment corresponds to, but does not track,
Donny’s desert bases. If Donny had manifest no desert bases related to Victoria’s robbery but
had the same proxies (e.g., the same origins, race, criminal history and tattoos), then the
procedural mechanisms would have generated the same conclusion about his liability to
punishment.
Neither the “response” nor the “tracking” versions of retributivism can be satisfied
simply by the realization of a state of affairs in which the deserving have been punished. Rather,

13
14

David O. Brink, Retributivism and Legal Moralism, 25 RATIO JURIS 496 (2012) (emphasis added).

See David Enoch, Levi Spectre, & Talia Fisher, Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of
Knowledge, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197 (2012); David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and
Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 STAN. L. REV. 557 (2015).
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the offender must punished because of her desert bases.15 Retributivists, then, seem committed to
a causal theory of punishment’s justification: for a token of punishment to be normatively
justified, someone’s desert bases must causally influence16 the infliction of punishment.17 It is
not enough that an offender’s punishment is merely proportionate to18 or commensurate with19
her desert bases. If such proportionality or commensurability were accidental, then the offender
would not be punished because she deserves it.
The causal notion helps explain why the Proxy case is problematic for retributivism. Say
that a token infliction of punishment is accurate when it corresponds to the offender’s desert
bases. The retributivist cannot be satisfied by a punishment infliction (as in Proxy) that is
accurate but in which the offender’s desert bases play no causal role. Even though the verdict in
Proxy is accurate, his desert bases do not figure into the explanation of why he is punished.
Therefore, the infliction of punishment in this case is normatively unjustified.
More broadly, the retributivist should condemn a criminal procedure mechanism that
assigns no role to desert bases in the infliction of punishment. This condemnation applies
regardless of the overall accuracy of the results that the mechanism generates. Put differently, the
15

See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983) (“Briefly stated, a
retributivist claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it.”); Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1017, 1040 (2014) (“The basic retributive idea is that punishment is justified because the offender deserves
it….”); Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 1319, 1324 (2004) (“Retributive justice obligates the state to punish an offender because and to the extent, but
only to the extent, he deserves to be punished.”).
16

Other retributivists go further, contending that an offender’s desert bases must be the sole causal influence on
the infliction of punishment. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 91 (1997) (“Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing
because and only because offenders deserve it.”); Christopher, supra note 7, at 859.
17

Note that the claim here concerns whether punishment is normatively justified. The Refined Retributivist
might also embrace the stronger claim that a gesture lacking the requisite etiology is not punishment at all, even if it
resembles punishment in all other respects.
18
19

See, e.g., Richard W. Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 197–98 (1982).

See, e.g., Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1441 (2004); Russ Shafer-Landau,
Retributivism and Desert, 81 PAC. PHIL. Q. 189 (2000).
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retributivist should be skeptical about a purely instrumental notion of criminal procedure, one in
which the goals of the system are set by normative theory and mechanisms of implementation
are justified solely in virtue of how well they implement those goals.20 Such instrumentalism
would neglect the essential causal role for an offender’s desert bases in the process of meting out
his punishment.
For the retributivist, though, it is not enough that an offender’s desert bases merely play
some causal role in punishment. Consider a second case, adapted from an example by
Christopher Heath Wellman.21
Lottery: Authorities conduct a lottery to select who will be punished for highprofile, unsolved crime. Authorities think it is highly likely that Diana was the
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, she is given four balls in the lottery, while
everyone else is given only one. One of Diana’s balls is selected in the lottery,
and she is punished for the crime. As it happens, Diana is actually the person who
committed the crime.
Like Proxy, Lottery would clearly be inconsistent with due process. The lottery process violates
the requirement that the state must introduce evidence of and prove (beyond a reasonable doubt)
every element of every offense with which the defendant is charged. The lottery also violates
Diana’s rights to confront her accusers and challenge the evidence against her. Further, the
lottery contravenes Diana’s right to assist in her own defense because it eliminates the possibility
that she could defend herself at all from the charges against her.
Although some do not recoil in horror from the notion of a punishment lottery,22 every
retributivist would or should see Lottery as problematic. A system that utilized this kind of
20

Some commentators associate retributivism with an instrumental view about the importance of criminal
procedure. See Cahill, supra note 8, and Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 8. Some provide broader defenses of the
instrumental view of procedure. See MARK R. REIFF, PUNISHMENT, COMPENSATION, AND LAW: A THEORY OF
ENFORCEABILITY (2005); Jonathan B. Wiener & Barak D. Richman, Mechanism Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 363 (Anne Joseph O’Connell & Daniel A Farber eds., 2009).
21

Christopher Heath Wellman, Procedural Rights, 20 LEGAL THEORY 286, 290 (2014).
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weighted penal lottery to establish liability to punishment would “detach[] punishment from
desert”23 in a way that is inconsistent with retributivism. The punishment lottery is arbitrary
because it leaves too much to luck.24 Punishment administered by lottery seems, to paraphrase
Justice Stewart’s famous dictum, “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.”25 Yet Simple Retributivism could not reach the intuitively correct
verdict in cases like Lottery, since Diana’s punishment corresponds to her desert bases. Further,
the penal lottery realizes the kind of causation requirement described above, since Diana’s desert
bases have some causal influence on her punishment—the increased number of Diana’s balls in
the lottery increases the chances that she will be punished.
For the retributivist, then, justified punishment requires a tighter connection between
desert bases and punishment than is realized in Lottery.26 Although Diana’s desert bases figure
into the decision to punish her, they figure only indirectly. These desert bases should figure more
directly if Diana’s punishment is to be normatively justified.
The connection between desert bases and punishment might be tightened in two respects.
First, an offender’s desert bases should make a more significant causal contribution to her

22

For example, Vincent Chiao contends that “under certain conditions, a penal lottery would be fair according
to an acceptable second-best standard of fairness.” Vincent Chiao, Ex ante Fairness in Criminal Law and
Procedure, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 277, 282 (2012). According to Chiao, the penal lottery would be fair (in this
second-order sense) but suboptimal, and a system that distributes discretion to legal officials provides a “still better
way of distributing punishment” fairly. Id. at 287–90. See also David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something
to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 62 (1989) (“[O]ur present practice amounts to a covert penal lottery. If the
penal lottery is just, so is our present practice. If not, not.”).
23

Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 691
(1994).
24

See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 385
(2004); Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEOR. INQ. L. 333, 351 (2002).
25
26

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J. concurring).

Wellman acknowledges this failing in conceding that, even if the use of a punishment lottery were justifiable
in an emergency, it would not be justified as a routine mechanism for meting out punishment. Wellman, supra note
21, at 292.
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punishment than they do in Lottery. Diana’s desert bases exert too remote an influence on her
punishment because her culpable wrongdoing only marginally increases the prospect that she
will be punished, even though officials think it is highly probable that she committed the crime.
In cases like this, a retributivist should require an offender’s desert bases to generate a greater
increase in the chances that she will be punished.
Second, an offender’s desert bases should figure robustly, rather than contingently, into
the infliction of punishment. Philip Pettit describes robustness in terms of values or goods:
someone can enjoy a robustly demanding value “only insofar as [he] enjoy[s] a corresponding,
intuitively thinner benefit…. not just actually, but across a certain range of possibilities, where
the extent of that range determines the degree of robustness with which [he enjoys] it.”27 Robust
concepts admit of purely counterfactual violations.28 For example, Pettit sees friendship as a
robustly demanding value. To be someone’s friend, you must favor her “reliably or robustly, and
not just as a contingent matter: not just as luck or chance or a spasm of good will would have
it.”29 It is possible to determine that someone is not your friend if she would not stand with you
in bad times. This conclusion holds even if times never go bad.
Retributivists should favor punishment procedures that attribute robust significance to an
offender’s desert bases. An offender’s actual desert bases should ground her liability to
punishment in her actual case. Moreover, if an offender’s desert bases were significantly
different, then her liability to punishment should (in virtue of these desert bases) differ to a

27

PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT, VIRTUE, AND RESPECT 2
(2015).
28

Nicholas Southwood, Democracy as a Modally Demanding Value, 49 NOÛS 504 (2015) (the realization of a
robustly demanding value “depends not only on what actually happens but also on what would happen in certain
non-actual circumstances”).
29

PETTIT, supra note 27, at 2.
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similar degree. On this logic, a retributivist should find Lottery problematic because whatever
significance this process attributes to Diana’s desert bases is too flimsy, and therefore the result
is unsafe.30 This unsafety is problematic regardless of how Diana’s case is resolved. If Diana’s
desert bases had changed in the time since the crime or Diana had merely been a “usual suspect”
who had not committed the crime, then she would not have deserved punishment. However,
under the penal lottery, Diana’s prospective liability to punishment would not have changed (or
changed sufficiently) in these alternative scenarios.
Simple Retributivism should therefore be modified further. For a token of punishment to
be normatively justified, an offender’s desert bases should play a direct role in (by exerting a
significant and robust causal influence on) her punishment. Call this notion the causation
requirement. At the case level, the retributivist should condemn punishment inflictions in which
the causation requirement is not realized. Systematically, the retributivist should support
mechanisms to ensure that the causation requirement is realized.
Yet even these modifications are not enough to meet all the due process challenges facing
Simple Retributivism. Consider a third case.
Evil Alibi: Delilah is charged with robbing Valerie five years ago. However,
judicial proceedings definitively establish that, at the time of the robbery of
Valerie, Delilah was actually robbing and murdering Theresa in another
jurisdiction in which the statute of limitations for all crimes is three years. Delilah
is nonetheless convicted of and punished for robbing Valerie, on the rationale that
exoneration of this crime would let her off the hook for her crimes against
Theresa.
In the Evil Alibi case, Delilah’s desert bases (that is, her culpable wrongdoing) causally
influence her punishment. These desert bases also figure directly and robustly into the
30

On epistemic accounts that adopt the “safety” principle as a requirement for knowledge, S’s belief in p counts
as knowledge only if “in most nearby possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief about [p] in the same
way as in the actual world the belief continues to be true.” Duncan Pritchard, Anti-Luck Epistemology, 158
SYNTHESE 277, 282–83 (2007).
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explanation of why Delilah is punished. Therefore, on a version of Simple Retributivism that
incorporates the causation requirement, Delilah’s punishment is normatively justifiable, although
perhaps less than what she ultimately deserves.
Intuitively, however, punishment in the Evil Alibi case does not seem to be justified or
legitimate. It is certainly inconsistent with due process. The explanation is that Delilah is
innocent, but in a sense that might seem trivial. Say that someone is trivially innocent of an
offense when she did not commit that offense, but committed another offense (or offenses) of at
least equal seriousness. In Evil Alibi, Delilah is trivially innocent of robbing Valerie because,
although she did not rob Valerie, she committed the more serious offenses of robbing and
murdering Theresa.
As a matter of due process, being trivially innocenct of a charged offense is a barrier to
being punished for that crime. In the U.S. criminal justice system, punishments are based on
specifically charged offenses. Punishment for uncharged offenses is illegitimate, and innocence
of a charged offense is sufficient to establish immunity to punishment for that offense.31 The
offense restriction, then, is the notion that a defendant’s desert bases only bear on her liability to
punishment if they are related to the offense for which she is charged.
The offense restriction seems so basic that retributivists often take it for granted.32 They
should not. Simple Retributivism cannot explain why punishment of the trivially innocent is
illegitimate. Simple Retributivism suggests that inflicting punishment in the Evil Alibi case is

31

See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1704–10 (2008); Samuel Morrison,
The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2005).
32

To this end, the Refined Retributivist might include something like the offense restriction as part of the
definition of punishment. Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/justice-retributive/ (contending that
retributivism is commited as a conceptual, rather than substantive, matter to the proposition that “one cannot punish
another whom one believes to be innocent”). Thanks to Peter Westen for encouraging me to consider this possibility.
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perfectly acceptable. That Delilah has committed an offense is sufficient to establish that she
deserves punishment. Indeed, the Simple Retributivist (echoing Kant) might see the proposition
that someone has committed a crime as simply equivalent to the proposition that he deserves
punishment.33 Further, as noted above, the problematic aspect of the Evil Alibi case cannot be
explained in terms of the causation requirement, since Delilah’s desert bases (i.e., her culpable
robbing and killing of Valerie) figure directly and robustly into the imposition of her
punishment.
Yet punishment in Evil Alibi is problematic. More generally, the offense restriction
seems integral to legitimate punishment under any theory of punishment. A version of
retributivism that denied the offense restriction would invite powerful objections. First, such a
view would not be able to guard against punishment of those who have not committed the crime
with which they are charged, which is routinely taken to be a main advantage of retributivism
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over consequentialism.34 Second, that trivial innocence bars conviction is a fundamental element
of due process, although (arguably) not an independent tenet of U.S. constitutional law.35
To rule out conviction of the trivially innocent, a retributivist should permit only desert
bases related to the charged offense to cause the offender to be punished. Someone’s
characteristics or conduct unrelated to the charged offense may not causally influence her
liability to punishment, even if these non-offense-related desert bases are (in the abstract)
sufficient to justify punishment. The retributivist is therefore committed to the seeing a
defendant’s desert bases as non-fungible determinants of whether punishment is justifiably
imposed on her.
To recap, Proxy is problematic because the defendant’s desert bases do not play a causal
role in the offender’s punishment; Lottery is problematic because the defendant’s desert bases
figure too contingently into her punishment; and Evil Alibi is problematic because the
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inappropriate desert bases cause the defendant’s punishment. These cases suggest the following
alternative to Simple Retributivism.
Refined Retributivism: An infliction of punishment is normatively justified if,
and only if, (a) a person is punished because of and to the extent that is warranted
by his offense-related desert bases, and (b) these offense-related desert bases
figure significantly and robustly into the determination that he is liable to
punishment.
In essence, Refined Retributivism adds the causation requirement and the offense restriction to
Simple Retributivism. A retributivist who finds the Proxy, Lottery, and Evil Alibi cases to be
problematic should accept Refined Retributivism and reject Simple Retributivism.
Without fully defending Refined Retributivism here, two contentions can be made on its
behalf. First, Refined Retributivism is consistent with due process in a way that Simple
Retributivism is not. The examples above indicate that Simple Retributivism is highly
revisionist. In denying the offense restriction, it does not require that punishment be meted out
based on charged offenses. Nor does it capture numerous due process considerations that are
essential to justified punishment, such as rules requiring the prosecution to prove every element
of a charged offense or precluding the infliction of criminal punishment based solely on the
defendant’s bad character or prior bad actions. Yet each of these considerations is integral to the
legitimacy of a criminal justice system, and each is also consistent with Refined Retributivism.
Limiting punishment to charged offenses (rather than allowing it to be based on prior acts or bad
character) furthers the offense restriction by ensuring that only offense-related desert bases
provide the basis for punishment. Similarly, many evidentiary rules (for example, those requiring
the exclusion of character evidence or evidence of prior criminal behavior) operate to ensure that
an offender is not deemed liable to punishment because of desert bases unrelated to the charged
offense.
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A second contention on behalf of Refined Retributivism is that it is compatible with
(indeed, implicit in) existing retributivist theories. To demonstrate this point, consider the
retributivist theories advanced by Michael Moore and Mitchell Berman.36 Both of these highly
sophisticated theories can be read to embrace either Simple or Refined Retributivism. However,
Refined Retributivism ultimately provides best interpretation of each view.
According to Moore, the function of criminal law is to attain “retributive justice,” which
demands “that those who deserve punishment get it.”37 In places, Moore offers a teleological
interpretation of retributive justice. “To serve retributive justice,” he contends, “criminal law
must punish all and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful
action.”38 Moore’s formulation here presupposes an instrumentalist approach to criminal
procedure: criminal procedure should effectuate the punishment of all and only the deserving.
For Moore, retributivism entails an obligation to “set up institutions so that retribution is
achieved.”39 Moore’s use of the passive voice indicates that what matters is attaining retribution,
rather than the specific way that retribution is attained. This formulation of Moore’s theory
therefore invokes Simple Retributivism: justice is achieved whenever (and criminal procedure
should ensure that) all and only those who have acted in a morally wrongful way are punished.
This interpretation of Moore’s view would omit both the causation requirement and the offense
restriction.
Elsewhere, however, Moore interprets retributive justice in a way that more closely
resembles Refined Retributivism. “To achieve retributive justice,” Moore argues, “the
36
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punishment must be inflicted because the offender did the offence. To the extent that someone is
punished for reasons other than that he deserves to be punished, retributive justice is not
achieved.”40 This formulation suggests both the causation requirement (that an offender’s desert
bases should figure directly into story of the infliction of punishment on him) and the offense
restriction (the only desert bases that should play this causal role are those related to the offense).
By implication, a token of punishment violates retributive justice if the offender’s desert bases
do not figure in the infliction or if extraneous considerations do.
Thus, Moore seems to offer two slogans for retributive justice: “Punish all and only those
people who deserve to be punished” and “Punish a person for a crime because (and only if) he
deserves to be punished for that crime.” These two slogans are not equivalent. Each leads to
different verdicts about the legitimacy of punishment in particular cases, and each presupposes a
different view about the point of criminal procedure. “Punish all and only those people who
deserve to be punished” can countenance the punishment of a morally culpable offender based
on considerations other than her desert bases (as in Proxy) or for offenses other than those with
which she has been charged (as in Evil Alibi). Given Moore’s interpretation of retributivism in
causal terms, the slogan “Punish a person for a crime because (and only if) he deserves to be
punished for that crime” seems to be the more considered formulation of Moore’s view. This
slogan is consistent with Refined Retributivism and inconsistent with Simple Retributivism.
Mitchell Berman’s “integrated dualist” theory of punishment also might be taken to
embrace both Simple and Refined Retributivism. Berman distinguishes “core” cases (which
involve “imposition of [punishment] on an actual offender on account of his offense, and only so
long as the imposition satisfies some reasonable proportionality constraint, whether of a
40
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retributivist or Benthamite variety”)41 from “peripheral” cases (which “involve imposition of
punishment on persons who are not wrongdoers, either because no offense occurred or because,
although it did, the individual was not responsible for it”).42 Berman argues that retributivism
offers the best justification for punishment in core cases, although some form of
consequentialism justifies punishment in peripheral cases.43
However, it is difficult to pin down whether Berman’s account of the retributivist
justification for punishment in core cases is an example of Simple or Refined Retributivism. At
one point, Berman contends that “core cases of punishment are justified because the offender’s
desert renders the fact that punishment inflicts suffering wholly inert as a reason against it—that
is, the offender’s suffering is not a bad and no right of his is infringed.”44 Berman also describes
his position as “that wrongdoers deserve to suffer on account of their blameworthy
wrongdoing.”45 These statements seem to embrace the causation requirement, but not the offense
restriction. In both of these statements, the transformative agent is the offender’s wrongdoing as
such, rather than his offense-related desert bases in particular.
Elsewhere, Berman embraces the offense restriction, but only in part.
[C]ore cases of punishment are justified, against the suffering they inflict, by
cancellation. When the person punished is morally responsible for the
commission of an offense, then her suffering on account of that offense, and
commensurate with her blameworthiness, simply is not a bad. Furthermore, the
state’s inflicting what it takes to be deserved suffering, for the sake of realizing
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such desert, does not infringe the offender’s rights insofar as such infliction treats
the offender with respect as a person.46
By way of background, Berman contends that justifying punishment requires justifying both that
the offender suffers and that the state inflicts this suffering. In requiring suffering to be “on
account of” a criminal offense, Berman concedes that only offense-related desert bases can
change the moral status of suffering imposed as punishment for an offense. However, Berman
also contends that the infliction of punishment does not violate the offender’s rights if this
infliction serves to “realiz[e the offender’s] desert.” Yet, in cases of trivial innocence (such as
Evil Alibi), an offender’s desert is realized by inflictions caused by her non-offense-related
desert bases. If realization of desert bases is all that matters, then Berman’s account does not
impose the offense restriction as a requirement for justified punishment (although the offense
restriction is required for justified impositions of suffering).
The best reading of Berman’s view seems to be that both the causation requirement47 and
the offense restriction48 apply to each aspect of the retributivist justification for punishment. If
so, then Berman’s view might be reformulated in light of Refined Retributivism as follows: in
core cases, the offender’s suffering is justified if, and only if, the offender’s offense-related
desert bases causally influence the process by which the offender suffers or is punished; and the
46
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state’s infliction of that punishment is justified if, and only if, the offender’s offense-related
desert bases cause the infliction of punishment.
Retributivists, then, should embrace Refined Retributivism over Simple Retributivism.
Simple Retributivism licenses egregious due process violations that Refined Retributivism does
not. Refined Retributivism is also implicit in many extant versions of retributivism and provides
the best interpretations of two of the most sophisticated theories of retributivism.
II. REFINED RETRIBUTIVISM AND RETRIBUTIVIST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Unlike Simple Retributivism, Refined Retributivism sees criminal procedure as integral to the
justification of punishment. If Refined Retributivism is the superior view, then it follows that at
least some questions about criminal procedure matter centrally to the normative justification of
punishment—that “just punishment” presupposes a “just process.”49 Defending Refined
Retributivism therefore requires articulating a Retributivist Criminal Procedure.
One core aspect of Retributivist Criminal Procedure is that a punishment is normatively
justified only if the determination that the offender is liable to punishment is epistemically
justified. Call this the justification standard. Justification is one of the central topics of
epistemology. Consider a broad, relatively uncontroversial notion of epistemic justification: that
[someone’s] belief in X is justified entails that there are [or that she has] good reasons (under the
applicable standard of proof) to believe X.50 For some commentators,51 justification as the
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general standard of legal proof—that is, a verdict is just only if the adjudicator has “not merely
good reason, but reason of a kind which would make it not be just luck… if the verdict is true.”52
On Refined Retributivism, the offense restriction states the epistemic goal for which the
adjudicator’s performance matters. To find that a defendant is liable to be punished for an
offense, the adjudicator must have a good reason to believe (or, on some accounts of
justification, must believe for a good reason) that she has manifested offense-related desert
bases. If any standard less demanding than justification applied, then the defendant’s punishment
would not be caused by her offense-related desert bases in the way that Refined Retributivism
calls for.
To be sure, Refined Retributivism might impose a more demanding epistemic standard
than justification. For example, the Refined Retributivist might adopt a “justified true belief”
standard, requiring that the adjudicator have a justified true belief that the offender manifested
offense-related desert bases.53 Under such a “justified true belief” standard, but not under the
justification standard, “a verdict based on justified beliefs will still have failed its [epistemic] aim
if it turns out to be false.”54 An even more demanding “knowledge” standard would require that
the adjudicator know (rather than merely having a justified true belief) that the offender
manifested offense-related desert bases.55 The justified true belief standard fails to rule out the
possibility that the protagonists in Gettier cases have knowledge. However, the usual intuition is
that these protagonists do not have knowledge. More broadly, Michael Pardo argues, the same
52
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considerations that make justified true beliefs insufficient for knowledge in Gettier cases also
make it the case that legal verdicts based solely on justified true beliefs fail to achieve their
epistemic goal.56 On Pardo’s view, legal verdicts “require more than truth and justification….
truth and justification also need to be connected in an appropriate way” in order “to achieve their
goal or aim.”57 Although there might be benefits to these more demanding epistemic standards,
there might also potential drawbacks. For the purposes of assessing Retributivist Criminal
Procedure, however, it does not matter which epistemic standard the Refined Retributivist
adopts, so long as the standard is at least as demanding as the justification standard.58
Commentators such as H. L. Ho, Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, and Pardo defend justification as a
general legal standard. On their position, any normatively justified verdict must meet a standard
at least as demanding as epistemic justification.59 For our purposes, it is unnecessary to provide
such a general defense of the justification standard. Rather, the point is that Refined
Retributivism is committed to the justification standard in the context of punishment—in
particular, for the adjudication that the offender has manifested desert bases related to the offense
with which he is charged.
Another core aspect of Retributivist Criminal Procedure is the causation requirement
described above in Part I. For a punishment infliction to be normatively justified, the defendant’s
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offense-related desert bases must exert a direct and robust influence on the determination that she
is liable to punishment. Otherwise, she is not punished because she deserves it. This causation
requirement is a substantive commitment of Refined Retributivism.60
Another way to state the Refined Retributivist position is that a verdict must satisfy both
the causation requirement and the justification standard in order to have what Larry Laudan calls
“validity.”61 Retributivist Criminal Procedure’s commitment to avoiding invalid verdicts derives
from of Refined Retributivism. If either the justification standard or the causation requirement
were violated in a particular case, then the offender would not be punished because of her
offense-related desert bases.62 This commitment prevents retributivism from sliding into Simple
Retributivism, which might countenance verdicts that are accurate but invalid. The central
principle of Retributivist Criminal Procedure, then, is that criminal procedure should avoid
invalid verdicts.
The commitment to avoiding invalid verdicts provides Refined Retributivism with
resources to evaluate both specific inflictions of punishment and the criminal justice system as a
whole.63 Under Retributivist Criminal Procedure, a token infliction of punishment is normatively
unjustified if it is invalid. An infliction that lacks epistemic justification—for example, where

60

The causation requirement might also be implicit in the epistemic standard implicit in a Refined Retributivist
view—for example, if one adopts the view that knowledge, rather than justification, is the standard for all
normatively justified legal verdicts.
61

LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 13 (2006).

62

The justification standard and the causation requirement do not necessarily exhaust Retributivist Criminal
Procedure. For example, the Refined Retributivist might (after Pardo) require a more demanding epistemic standard
than justification. However, these two notions seem like a baseline for Retributivist Criminal Procedure. No Refined
Retributivist could settle for an epistemic standard less exacting than justification. Nor could a Refined Retributivist
countenance punishment based on accidents or deviant causal chains. Therefore, these two notions are treated as
equivalent to Retributivist Criminal Procedure for the remainder of the article.
63

Simple Retributivism might also be formulated as applying at the level of systems and the level of cases.
Moreover, it is possible that a case-focused version of Simple Retributivism could avoid some of the due process
infirmities highlighted in Part I. Thanks to Craig Agule and Mihailis Diamantis for identifying this discrepancy.

RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 25
there is no good reason for the adjudicator to believe that the offender manifested offense-related
desert bases as alleged—would thus be normatively unjustified. So, too, would an infliction in
which the adjudicator has justified beliefs about the offender’s desert bases, but these beliefs do
not causally influence the offender’s liability to punishment.
At the systemic level, Retributivist Criminal Procedure calls for adjudication mechanisms
that appropriately track the desert bases of offenders. The systemic logic of Retributivist
Criminal Procedure requires eliminating invalid verdicts.64 Since Refined Retributivism cannot
countenance an invalid verdict when assessing a specific case, consistency requires a similar
intolerance to invalid verdicts when assessing criminal justice institutions as a whole. In other
words, the Refined Retributivist cannot simultaneously treat desert as categorically important at
the token level but only contingently important (that is, capable of being overridden by other
values or benefits) at the system level.
Retributivist Criminal Procedure’s commitment to avoiding invalid verdicts has a number
of practical implications, some of which are explored in more depth in Part III. At a minimum,
Refined Retributivism favors standards of proof and rules of evidence to ensure that verdicts
implicate the offender’s offense-related desert bases in the requisite way. Refined Retributivism
also demands that each defendant have opportunities to avoid punishment inflictions that lack
epistemic justification—for example, by having the opportunity to challenge a sentence on the
grounds that one’s offense-related desert bases did not appropriately figure into the
determination of one’s liability.
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At the systemic level, Retributivist Criminal Procedure’s commitment to avoiding invalid
verdicts contrasts with the view that promoting accuracy is the main goal of criminal procedure.
One position along these lines is that criminal procedure should be assessed based on “case
accuracy,” or whether “the result in a particular case was correct.”65 Another position is that the
goal of criminal procedure is “systemic accuracy,” or the maximization of “accurate results in all
future cases.”66 Many theorists see systemic accuracy as the goal of criminal procedure,67 and of
procedural rules more broadly.68 Systemic accuracy is often posited to be the overriding
procedural goal for consequentialist theories of punishment generally, and deterrence theories in
particular.69
Some contend that retributivism enshrines accuracy (either at the case level or at the
systemic level) as the overriding goal of criminal procedure. For example, Richard Bierschbach
and Alex Stein suggest that retributivists should evaluate procedural mechanisms in terms of
case accuracy, favoring mechanisms “to the extent that they can achieve ultimate factual
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accuracy of outcomes in individual cases.”70 Along these lines, Michael Cahill sees systemic
accuracy as the lodestar of retributivism’s criminal procedure. On Cahill’s consequentialistflavored version of retributivism, the goal of the criminal justice system is to “maximize the total
amount of deserved punishment the system imposes,” with the total being a function of “the
number of offenders caught, the amount of (deserved) punishment per offender, and the cost of
apprehending each offender.”71 Cahill contemplates that the retributivist might even favor rules
of criminal procedure that “generate results that run counter to desert in some cases,” so long as
these rules have the effect of “making retributively ‘right’ outcomes more likely” in the
“majority of cases.”72 If (as both Bierschbach and Stein and Cahill contend) the main point of
criminal procedure is to achieve accurate (rather than valid) results, then retributivism supports
any procedural mechanism that ensures or improves the accuracy of verdicts.
Yet prioritizing accuracy over validity in this way presumes Simple Retributivism and
conflicts with Refined Retributivism. Refined Retributivism could not countenance a verdict that
is accurate but invalid—for instance, a verdict (like the ones in Proxy and Lottery) that is only
accidentally correct. Such a verdict would violate the causation requirement. Nor could Refined
Retributivism countenance a verdict (like the one in Evil Alibi) in which an offender’s nonoffense-related desert bases cause him to be punished. This kind of verdict would violate both
the causation requirement and the justification standard. Yet the mechanisms described in each
of these cases might improve accuracy at the case or systemic levels. If so, then all three of these
cases would (on the views of both Cahill and Bierschbach and Stein) be unobjectionable.
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Retributivist Criminal Procedure therefore departs from the goal of maximizing accuracy
by ruling out mechanisms that would increase accuracy at the cost of generating invalid verdicts.
Retributivist principles of criminal procedure cannot sacrifice the causation requirement or
epistemic justification for other procedural goals. A society whose criminal procedure aims to
maximize systemic accuracy should utilize the mechanism described in Proxy if doing so would
lead to more accurate verdicts over the range of cases. Yet Refined Retributivism reaches the
opposite conclusion: the proxy mechanism violates Retributivist Criminal Procedure because the
defendant’s offense-related desert bases do not exert the requisite causal influence.
To be sure, the proponent of Retributivist Criminal Procedure can see accuracy as an
important procedural value. A Refined Retributivist might well construe verdict validity and
accuracy as jointly paramount criminal procedure goals.73 Yet whether accuracy and validity are
both overriding goals is a substantive question on which Refined Retributivists might disagree.
The point here is not to resolve this question. Rather, for every version of Refined Retributivism,
an invalid verdict provides sufficient grounds for condemning a punishment infliction as
normatively unjustified.
To summarize: for an infliction of punishment to be normatively justified under
Retributivist Criminal Procedure, (a) a defendant’s offense-related desert bases must causally
influence her liability to punishment, and (b) the adjudicator must at least be epistemically
justified in believing (or have an epistemically justified belief) that the defendant has exhibited
73

For example, some versions of Refined Retributivism might adopt a more demanding epistemic standard than
justification (e.g., justified true belief or knowledge) as a precondition for normatively justifying any punishment
infliction. To require that verdicts be true in addition to being justified is to enshrine accuracy as a goal of criminal
procedure. On these more demanding epistemic standards, a verdict would be normatively justified only if it were
both epistemically justified, causally appropriate, and accurate. See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 61, at 14. On this
move, the epistemic goals of justification and causation would not have priority over the epistemic goal of accuracy.
However, neither could justification (or causation) be traded off for accuracy. Rather, accuracy and validity would
be jointly necessary for the normative justification of punishment inflictions.

RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 29
offense-related desert bases. If either the causation requirement or the justification standard is
violated, then an infliction of punishment is normatively unjustified. At the system level,
Retributivist Criminal Procedure calls for mechanisms that reduce or eliminate invalid verdicts,
independently of whether such mechanisms realize other procedural values (such as fairness or
accuracy).
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RETRIBUTIVIST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Retributivist Criminal Procedure seems to call for significant revision to U.S. criminal justice
institutions. These revisionist tendencies provide a route to challenge both Retributivist Criminal
Procedure and Refined Retributivism more broadly.
To be sure, Refined Retributivism and Retributivist Criminal Procedure can explain many
features of due process. The notion that punishment must be meted out based on charged
offenses is consistent with the causation requirement. So is the idea that the prosecution has the
burden to prove each element of a charged offense. To adhere to the justification standard, each
defendant must be allowed to contest her charges or conviction on the grounds of legal
sufficiency—for example, by contending that the state has failed to produce sufficient evidence
regarding each element of every crime for which the defendant is convicted.
However, Retributivist Criminal Procedure would seem to call for at least two broad
types of changes to the U.S. criminal justice system. First, a direct application of Retributivist
Criminal Procedure condemns a range of mechanisms that empower criminal justice officials to
act pretextually, since pretextual actions are inconsistent with both the offense restriction and the
causation requirement. Because such pretextual mechanisms are widely criticized, these
revisionist implications might be applauded. Second, Retributivist Criminal Procedure condemns
invalid verdicts. Yet many of procedural rules and norms that are central to the U.S. system of
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criminal justice (and to due process more broadly construed) have the effect of promoting invalid
verdicts. Therefore, these procedural implications call into question whether Refined
Retributivism can undergird a just or legitimate criminal justice system.
A. Pretextual Mechanisms
Directly applying Retributivist Criminal Procedure to criminal justice officials rules out
pretextual actions. In general, a pretextual action is one where the official’s action is prompted
by considerations different than those that are sufficient to justify the action, and the prompting
considerations are insufficient to justify the action. Pretextual actions violate the causation
requirement and the offense restriction, generating cases in which the defendant’s offense-related
desert bases do not exert a robust causal influence on the official’s action and, by implication, the
defendant’s punishment.
Pretextual mechanisms pervade every stage of the U.S. criminal justice system.
Pretextual investigative stops are exemplified by the facts of Whren v. United States.74 In 1993, a
sport utility vehicle with two African-American occupants was stopped for an extended period at
a traffic light in an area of Washington D.C. with high drug activity. Two undercover police
officers noticed the SUV and made a U-turn toward it. The SUV reacted by speeding away and
turning right without signaling. In violation of a departmental policy that prevented undercover
officers from making traffic stops, the officers pulled over the SUV. Once pulled over, the
officers saw several large plastic bags containing crack cocaine and arrested the driver. The
officers’ stop was likely pretextual. Although the officers had probable cause to pull the SUV
over for the traffic offenses of speeding and turning without signaling, doing so was a violation
of departmental policy. Assume arguendo that that the officers’ intention was to investigate the
74
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crime of distributing narcotics (for which they lacked adequate justification to detain Whren)
rather than the traffic offense (for which they had adequate justification). In Whren, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained in the traffic stop was properly introduced against
Whren at trial. Because the officers had probable cause to believe that Whren had violated the
traffic code, their stop of Whren’s vehicle was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
The holding in Whren is inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Whren’s
non-offense-related desert bases (i.e., those related to his suspected drug dealing) prompted his
detainment for the traffic violations. If Whren and his passenger had not been suspected drug
dealers, then the undercover officers would not have stopped them for these minor traffic
offenses. Pretextual actions like those in Whren allow for circumventions of the justification
standard. The officers who arrested Whren did not have a legally sufficient reason to believe that
he was a drug dealer. Retributivist Criminal Procedure holds, in general, that a lack of epistemic
justification regarding an offender’s desert bases is a barrier to normatively justifying his
punishment. However, pretextual stops like those in Whren make the epistemic standard
permeable: an officer can create the justification to search for drugs out of considerations that do
not otherwise justify searching for drugs.
At the charging stage, pretextual prosecution involves “law enforcers [] go[ing] after a
criminal defendant because they suspect him of one crime … and then … charg[ing] and
convict[ing] him of a different crime, unrelated to and less severe than the first.”75 The most
famous case of pretextual prosecution is the U.S. federal government’s pursuit and conviction of
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Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 584 (2005).
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Al Capone on criminal tax evasion charges, rather than for the vast array of more serious crimes
that Capone committed as part of his criminal syndicate. Pretextual prosecution is the official
policy of the United States Department of Justice and many state prosecutors’ offices.76
Yet pretextual prosecution is inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Take
Capone’s case. Although Capone manifested desert bases related to the offense of tax evasion,
these desert bases did not play the kind of direct or robust role in Capone’s punishment that
Refined Retributivism demands. Had another person failed to pay her taxes in the way that
Capone did, she would almost certainly not have been prosecuted or punished as Capone was.
Instead, pretextual prosecution allowed officials to punish Capone for being a gangster while
avoiding establishing that Capone engaged in specific gangster activities. Punishing Capone
because of these non-offense-related desert bases is inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal
Procedure because it violates both the causation requirement and the offense restriction.
At the verdict stage, the vast majority of verdicts establishing criminal liability arise from
plea bargaining, the process whereby a defendant agrees to plead guilty to an offense “in
exchange for discretionary consideration on the part of the state,” usually “some kind of
assurance of a minimal sentence.”77 As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “criminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”78 Most criminal cases in the
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United States are resolved through plea bargains,79 yet the process of plea bargaining is largely
unregulated under the U.S. Constitution.80
Many commentators criticize plea bargaining on grounds of accuracy. The plea
bargaining process is said to allow prosecutors to extract guilty pleas out of innocent
defendants,81 as well as to allow those who committed an offense to be punished less than they
deserve.82 Justice Scalia invoked both of these accuracy-based criticisms in noting that plea
bargaining dynamics “effectively compel[] an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by
pleading guilty to a lesser offense; and for guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results
in a sentence well below what the law prescribes for the actual crime.”83 This inaccuracy is
sometimes portrayed, not as a contingent characteristic of the U.S. system, but rather a function
of the structural features that give rise to plea bargaining.84
Regardless of whether plea bargaining generates verdicts that do not correspond to an
offender’s desert bases, the Refined Retributivist should see it as problematic. Even where a plea
generates an accurate punishment infliction, this infliction is almost certainly invalid. To
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illustrate this point, consider an example based on Bordenkircher v. Hayes.85 Hayes was charged
with the offense of forgery and, under a recidivist offender statute, faced life imprisonment if
convicted. Hayes was offered the opportunity to plead guilty to forgery and be sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment. Hayes refused the deal, was convicted of forgery, and received a sentence
of life imprisonment, which the Supreme Court upheld.
Imagine an alternative version of this scenario in which Hayes accepts the plea deal in
order to avoid the possibility of being sentenced under the recidivist offender statute. Assume,
arguendo, that Hayes actually committed the forgery and also that a prison term of five years is
commensurate with Hayes’s desert bases. In this alternative scenario, Hayes’s bargaining
position would exert a direct and robust causal influence on his punishment. If Hayes’s desert
bases had been the same but his bargaining position had been different (e.g., if he had
information or testimony to provide to the state in exchange for a lesser sentence), then Hayes
would have been offered a more favorable plea deal and punished less, if at all. Thus, even when
a plea bargain is accurate, there is only a contingent connection between a defendant’s offenserelated desert bases and the punishment that is inflicted. This contingency runs afoul of the
causation requirement of Retributivist Criminal Procedure, which requires the connection to be
more robust. Thus, punishment arising from a plea bargain is invalid and, in light of Refined
Retributivism, normatively unjustified.
Thus, pretextual stops, pretextual prosecutions, and plea bargaining are all inconsistent
with Retributivist Criminal Procedure.86 Whren was not punished for his offense-related desert
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To these charges of revisionism, the Refined Retributivist might offer a rebuttal based on the division of
labor. On this rebuttal, Retributivist Criminal Procedure applies only to mechanisms that determine a defendant’s
liability to punishment, rather than to all mechanisms in the criminal justice system. The defendant’s offense-related
desert bases needn’t cause the actions of police or the charging decisions of criminal justice officials. Any problems
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bases. Nor was Capone. Nor would Hayes have been, had he taken the plea deal. Since all of
these features are common in the U.S. criminal justice system, Retributivist Criminal Procedure
seems highly revisionist.
Whether these revisionist implications are objectionable depends on the legitimacy of
pretextual mechanisms of criminal procedure. A Refined Retributivist might well embrace the
charge of revisionism here. Each of the pretextual mechanisms described above is among the
most highly criticized aspects of the criminal justice system.87 Critics have contended that these
practices facilitate racial discrimination by officials88 and contribute to excessive and racially
disparate punishment outcomes.89 Retributivist Criminal Procedure provides an independent
criticism of each of these pretextual practices: namely, that they are inconsistent with the notion
that an offender should be punished for an offense because she deserves to be punished for that
offense.
B. Causation-Obscuring and Justification-Obscuring Mechanisms
Some rules of criminal procedure obscure information relevant to the causation requirement
and/or the justification standard, thereby increasing the likelihood of invalid verdicts. These
mechanisms are difficult to reconcile with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Yet many of these
introduced at investigative or charging stages can be resolved if the offender’s desert bases exert a direct and robust
causal influence on the verdict itself. This division-of-labor rebuttal seems powerful, although fully evaluating it is
outside the scope of this paper. However, two points about the division-of-labor rebuttal are worth noting. First, the
rebuttal concedes that retributivism cannot be the sole principle for regulating the criminal justice system, a
concession that some retributivists would be unwilling to make. Second, even if the rebuttal succeeds, Retributivist
Criminal Procedure would still have revisionist implications regarding plea bargining, since this practice determines
liability to punishment. Thanks to Mihailis Diamantis for encouraging discussion of this rebuttal.
87

See, e.g., Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 250 (2010); WILLIAM
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPS OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295, 301 (2011).
88

See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1075
(2010).
89

See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241
(2012).

RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 36
mechanisms are core features of an adversarial system of criminal justice, and some are basic
matters of due process.
The rules and norms regarding legal representation of criminal defendants work to
frustrate both the causation requirement and the justification standard. The Sixth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings, a provision
that has been interpreted to require states to provide counsel for indigent defendants charged with
felonies.90 Beyond these formal requirements, widely recognized professional norms among U.S.
criminal defense lawyers enshrine an ideal of “zealous advocacy.”91 Implicit in the notion of
zealous advocacy is that defense counsel is authorized and should be committed to use
aggressive tactics (such as strategic delay, presenting misleading testimony, arguing to the jury
that evidence supports factual inferences that the lawyer knows to be untrue, calling for
nullification, or disclosing information that a lawyer knows “does not contribute to informed
determination on the merits because such disclosure injures the prosecution or witnesses”)
whenever doing so is “advantageous to the client.”92
The norms of zealous advocacy are hypothesized to increase the likelihood of invalid
verdicts, both systematically and at the case level. As William Simon notes, such norms not only
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“treat[] all defendants alike” in trying to “help [them] thwart conviction regardless of whether or
not they are guilty,” but also “help many defendants present themselves as something other than
they are” by “portray[ing] defendants who have committed acts with which they have been
charged as not having committed them” and “orchestrat[ing] clients’ behavior in court … to
conform to the judge’s and jury’s stereotypes about how a respectable, law-abiding citizen looks
and behaves.”93 Many aggressive tactics aim to focus the adjudicator’s attention on
considerations unrelated to the defendant’s offense-related desert bases, such as the possible
culpability of a third party94 or the race of the defendant, the victim, or the police.95
An example of this last phenomenon is Johnny Cochran’s defense of O.J. Simpson
against charges that he murdered Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman. In closing
arguments, Cochran urged jurors to acquit Simpson and therefore “send a message” that the Los
Angeles Police Department’s deception and racism should not be tolerated.96 Cochran’s tactic
was intended to shift the jury’s attention away from the question of whether there was good
reason to believe that Simpson committed the murders and toward the question of whether there
was good reason to believe that Los Angeles police were racially biased. To the extent that this
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tactic was successful, the jury’s acquittal of Simpson did not reflect a collective judgment about
whether he manifested offense-related desert bases.
The Simpson example indicates how zealous advocacy might undermine the causation
requirement. If the defense attorney successfully shifts the question, then the defendant’s desert
bases (or lack thereof) do not exert the type of robust causal influence on his liability to
punishment that Retributivist Criminal Procedure calls for. In other words, the causation
requirement is open to violation whenever the subject is switched from a question about the
defendant’s desert bases to some other question, regardless of how the jury resolves that other
question. Further, aggressive defense techniques like Cochran’s, if successful, are inconsistent
with the justification standard. False acquittals (or acquittals in cases where there is sufficiently
good reason to believe that the defendant has committed an offense) are epistemically unjustified
in the same way that false convictions are.97 Retributivist Criminal Procedure, then, is in tension
with the norm of zealous advocacy among criminal defense attorneys.
Rules excluding evidence from use by the prosecution also promote invalid verdicts, and
so may also be condemned by Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Some such evidentiary rules
preclude introducing entire categories of evidence as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief.98
Jeremy Bentham offered an accuracy-based argument for the abolition of these evidentiary
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rules.99 In the words of one commentator, Bentham saw “fixing rules for the exclusion of
evidence [as] more likely to cause misdecision on deceptive evidence.”100 Bentham’s argument
against such evidentiary rules is therefore “a straightforward application of his general utilitarian
theory of procedure to the special case of evidence.”101
Unlike Bentham’s view, Retributivist Criminal Procedure favors certain exclusionary
rules, particularly rules prohibiting introduction of evidence regarding the defendant’s character
or prior bad acts as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. To be sure, it is an open question
whether introducing such evidence increases the overall accuracy of verdicts.102 Yet regardless
of how such evidence bears on the accuracy of verdicts, it compromises their validity whenever a
defendant is deemed liable to punishment based on considerations other than his offense-related
desert bases. The logic of this position is captured by the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in
Michelson v. United States:
The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal
acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be
persuasive that he is by propensity a logical perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry
is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
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general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge.103
Retributivist Criminal Procedure provides an argument in favor of rules excluding evidence of
bad character and prior bad acts. Such rules serve to safeguard violations of the offense
restriction and the causation requirement.
However, Refined Retributivism shares Bentham’s skepticism about evidentiary rules
that tend to promote invalid verdicts. One example from the United States is the Exclusionary
Rule, which precludes the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by the state in
violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights—for example, as the result of a search or seizure
that violates the Fourth Amendment or arising from an interrogation that violates the Fifth
Amendment—as part of its case-in-chief.104 As a doctrinal matter, the Exclusionary Rule is
justified solely on grounds of deterring police misconduct.105 Therefore, the ostensible logic of
the Exclusionary Rule is inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure’s attribution of
preeminent importance to verdict validity. At least as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Exclusionary Rule presupposes what Retributivist Criminal Procedure denies: that both the
causation requirement and the justification standard can be sacrificed for other procedural goals.
Apart from this doctrinal inconsistency, there is a deeper tension between the
Exclusionary Rule and Retributivist Criminal Procedure. The Exclusionary Rule restricts the
factfinder’s access to information that is relevant to determining whether the defendant
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manifested offense-related desert bases, therefore increasing the chance of an invalid verdict in
any particular case and the number of invalid verdicts overall. To illustrate this point, consider an
alternative version of the Whren case in which the trial court excluded evidence obtained from
Whren’s vehicle on the grounds that the seizure and search violated the Fourth Amendment. In
this scenario, the jury would not have been allowed to consider evidence directly relevant to
whether Whren manifested desert bases related to the drug offenses with which Whren was
charged. In the absence of such evidence, the jury could either acquit or convict Whren of the
charges. In this alternative scenario, an acquittal of Whren would have been invalid,106 since
there was sufficiently good evidence that he manifested offense-related desert bases and
therefore (according to Refined Retributivism) that he deserved to be punished for the offense.
On the other hand, if Whren had been convicted in the absence of this search-related evidence,
then the conviction might also have been invalid—for example, if the jury had made inferential
moves to fill in gaps created by the exclusion of directly relevant evidence.107
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Retributivist Criminal Procedure is therefore in tension with norms of zealous advocacy
and the Exclusionary Rule. Given these implications, Refined Retributivists are (perhaps
surprisingly) allied with consequentialists like Bentham on many questions of criminal
procedure.108 Whereas consequentialists would justify these revisions to the extent that they
increase verdict accuracy, Retributivist Criminal Procedure might justify them as a way to avoid
invalid verdicts.109
Norms of zealous advocacy and the Exclusionary Rule are not necessarily central to due
process. As a doctrinal matter, neither of these mechanisms are considered “fundamental to the
American scheme of justice,” which is one standard for characterizing requirements of due
process.110 A defendant whose lawyer provides less-than-zealous advocacy is not entitled to a

possess drugs, the state could have used the fruits of the unlawful stop to impeach his testimony. Thus, on Laudan
and Allen’s logic, from the absence of Whren’s testifying that he did not possess the drugs, the jury might infer that
he did possess the drugs.
Inferential moves like the ones that Laudan and Allen describe are violations of Retributivist Criminal
Procedure because the defendant’s offense-related desert bases do not play the kind of direct, robust causal role in
the judgment that the defendant is liable to punishment that Refined Retributivism requires. To the extent that the
defendant’s offense related desert bases play some causal role in this judgment, it would seem to be an instance of an
indirect or “deviant” kind of causation. See Sorensen, supra note 49, at 172. Punishment in such cases would violate
both the directness and robustness aspects of the causation requirement, for the same reasons that the mechanism
described in the Lottery case does.
108

To be sure, this overlap would not be surprising to commentators who see accuracy as the overriding
procedural goal of both retributivists and consequentialists. See, e.g., Bierschbach and Stein, supra note 8; Cahill,
supra note 8. Nor would the overlap be surprising to a punishment theorist (such as Laudan) who takes verdict
validity and accuracy as equally important criminal procedure goals.
109

For example, Bentham decried aggressive defense techniques by criminal defense attorneys, on the grounds
that using these techniques was functionally equivalent to complicity in a client’s crime. BENTHAM, supra note 99,
at 474–75. The consequentialist would likely agree with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s observation that the
Exclusionary Rule’s operation in the U.S. criminal justice system allows for criminal trials to be “sever[ed] … from
external reality to an unacceptable extent. Exclusions hide truth, rather than seeking to reveal it. That is not a
comfortable place for a trial, or any honest instrument of inquiry, to be.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of
American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1164 (2014).
110

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 43
reversal of her conviction.111 Moreover, states are not required to adopt the Exclusionary Rule
for violations of state constitutional provisions.112 Further, both zealous advocacy and the
Exclusionary Rule are routinely criticized by commentators, in part for their tendency to produce
inaccurate verdicts.113
However, the logic of Retributivist Criminal Procedure is in tension with a number of
other procedural rules that are more fundamental to due process. Among these are the
defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses,114 to have the prosecution disclose evidence
that tends to prove the defendant’s innocence or provides a basis for impeaching government
witnesses,115 against being compelled to provide incriminating evidence against himself,116
against double jeopardy,117 and against having coerced confessions introduced against him.118
Likewise, a defendant’s rights to be tried by a jury reflecting a “fair cross-section” of the
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the Exclusionary Rule as a requirement of due process (see, e.g., Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary
Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885 (2014)) and political morality (see, e.g., H. L. Ho, The Criminal Trial, the Rule of
Law and the Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence, 10 CRIM. LAW & PHIL. 109 (2016)) do not render it
compatible with Retributivist Criminal Procedure, since these arguments do not establish that the Exclusionary Rule
meets the goal of reducing and/or eliminating invalid verdicts.
114

U.S. Const., Amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
115

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

116

U.S. Const., Amend. V (“[N]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”).
117

U.S. Const., Amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.”).
118

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–35 (2000).

RETRIBUTIVISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | 44
community,119 against racial discrimination by state officials in the composition of a jury,120 and
even to a jury trial itself121 are difficult to square with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. As a
doctrinal matter, the rationale for each of these rules under U.S. law is based on considerations
other than the promotion of accurate and/or justified verdicts.122 Indeed, many of these rules are
justified regardless of whether they tend to make verdicts less accurate or less justified.123
Moreover, each of these rules significantly increases (at both the case and system levels)
the prospect of invalid verdicts. For example, consider the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination, which prohibits the state from forcing the defendant to testify under a wide
variety of circumstances. Retributivist Criminal Procedure would seem to condemn the privilege,
regardless of whether abolishing the privilege affects the accuracy of verdicts. The privilege
obscures the causation requirement to the extent that the defendant’s testimonial evidence
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provides direct evidence about whether she manifested offense-related desert bases. Excluding
this type of evidence increases the possibility that the defendant’s offense-related desert bases
will not causally influence the verdict. It also increases the chances that a defendant’s nonoffense-related desert bases will exert influence. Both of these prospects are unacceptable under
Retributivist Criminal Procedure, since each increases the likelihood of invalid verdicts.
Likewise, the privilege obscures epistemic justification by precluding the factfinder from
accessing a source of potentially good reasons. In light of these effects, it seems plausible that,
ceteris peribus, a system in which defendants lacked rights against self-incrimination would have
fewer invalid verdicts than a system in which they had this right.124
The same logic applies to all of the other procedural rules described above. These rules
are justified by goals (such as fairness or legitimacy or accuracy) that are hostile to Retributivist
Criminal Procedure. The effect (and, in many cases, the point) of these rules is to preclude an
offender’s desert bases from causing his liability or to frustrate the realization of the justification
standard. Therefore, each of these procedural mechanisms are difficult to reconcile with
Retributivist Criminal Procedure. .
These tensions should trouble the Refined Retributivist. A comprehensive account of due
process in criminal procedure would be necessary to fully vindicate the importance of each of
these rules. Absent such an account, it is enough to note that each of these features meets the
lower due process standard of being “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”125 and
many of these features meet the higher due process standard of being part of the “very essence of
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a scheme of ordered liberty.”126 At first glance, Retributivist Criminal Procedure not only fails to
capture why these procedural rules are important, but also can be read to imply that the criminal
justice system should modify or eliminate them.127
CONCLUSION
Retributivist theories of punishment can be described in both simple and refined versions,
depending on how an offender’s desert bases must figure in the effectuation of normatively
justified punishment. Refined Retributivism seems, at first blush, to be superior to Simple
Retributivism. Simple Retributivism allows for a range of unjust and illegitimate mechanisms of
criminal procedure that Refined Retributivism rules out. Yet, Refined Retributivism (via
Retributivist Criminal Procedure) also condemns significant portions of the U.S. criminal justice
system. These procedural implications lead to the conclusion that Refined Retributivism, like
Simple Retributivism, should not undergird a criminal justice system.
Retributivists have several possible responses to the indictment presented here. Perhaps,
contrary to the arguments raised in Part I, Simple Retributivism can be formulated in a manner
consistent with due process after all. Perhaps an alternative version of Retributivist Criminal
Procedure (say, one that does not prioritize verdict validity) is better supported than the one
contemplated here. Perhaps, contrary to the understanding of due process utilized in Part III, the
mechanisms in tension with Retributivist Criminal Procedure are not actually fundamental to the
126

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

127

Consider the following position, which is consistent with Refined Retributivism. The goal of retributivist
criminal procedure is not to ensure valid verdicts, but rather to protect against invalid inflictions of punishment.
Therefore, every normatively infliction of punishment must satisfy the causation requirement and justification
standard. However, invalid acquittals are not necessarily problematic. Procedural values unrelated to an offender’s
desert bases might both prompt and normatively justify acquitting her, even if these same considerations could not
(consistent with Refined Retributivism) prompt and normatively punishing her.
As far as I know, no retributivist has articulated anything like this position. Moreover, defending this position
would be a tall order. However, such a position might tame some (although not all) of the revisionist tendencies of
Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Thanks to Nathan Hanna for suggesting this point.
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U.S. scheme of criminal justice or to due process per se. Perhaps retribution should only serve as
an abstract ideal, rather than as the general aim of the criminal justice system. Yet if the
procedural implications of retributivism identified here are sound, then the retributivist faces a
choice. She can advocate for retributivism or she can advocate for due process, but she cannot
consistently advocate for both.
The failure to address the theoretical importance of criminal procedure is not unique to
retributivists. Indeed, non-retributivist theories face many of the same obstacles in reconciling
normatively justified punishment with due process. Those who disagree with the preceding
analysis of retributivism and criminal procedure might still accept that the question “What is the
point of criminal punishment?” is closely connected to the question “What is the point of
criminal procedure?” The former question is asked and answered often, and in a variety of ways.
The latter question deserves closer attention in its own right, not just because of its bearing on
the former.

